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1954]

Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - COMPLETE IMMUNITY GRANTED
TO WITNESSES BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari after the
Court of Appeals of Maryland had affirmed petitioner's conviction in the
Criminal Court of Baltimore of conspiring to violate the state lottery laws.1
This conviction was based upon a confession given by petitioner in answer
to questions by a Senate Committee investigating crime, before which he
had been summoned. Petitioner contended that such usage of his confession was forbidden by a federal statute granting immunity to witnesses in
Congressional hearings. 2
In reversing the judgment and remanding the cause, the Supreme Court
held that a witness so summoned by a Congressional Committee is not required to claim the protection of the Fifth Amendment as to each question
directed to him before he is entitled to the protection of the statute, that the
phrase "any court" in the statute is not limited in its application to federal
courts but includes state courts and precludes the use of the immunized testimony as evidence in prosecutions therein as well; and, that the statute does
not accord "complete immunity" to the subpoenaed witness beyond the
scope of the testimony actually received. s
What is "complete immunity," and how far does an "immunity bath"
extend, are basic questions with which immunity statutes such as the one
herein have been continually connected. 4
Although there is authority to the contrary, the seemingly better view
is that a constitutional provision against compulsory self-incrimination is
not satisfied by a statute requiring a person to testify or give evidence where
the only immunity offered in lieu of the constitutional privilege is that the
testimony or evidence so produced shall not thereafter be used in evidence
against him.5 The principal fault which courts have found with such statutes is that the witness is still open to prosecution and may be convicted on
evidence independent of, but obtained from sources suggested by, the very
1

Adams v. State of Maryland, 74 Sup. Ct. 442 (1954).
given by a witness before either House or before any committee of
either House, or before any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, shall be used as evidence against him in any
court, except in a prosecution for perjury committed in giving such testimony. But
an official paper or record produced by him is not within said privilege." 62 STAT.
833, 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1948).
'Adams v. State of Maryland, supra at 445.
'8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2281 (3rd Ed. 1940).
'See Note, 118 A.L.R. 602, 605 (1939).
' "No testimony

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

information which he has been forced to reveal. 6 The Court in the principal
case takes the former view when it states that the statute does not give complete immunity.7 Under this view it is held that the protection accorded
witnesses by the Fifth Amendment is not adequately established by the statute for no provision is included which prohibits the use of elicited testimony
to discover other evidence with which to prosecute,' and, therefore it would
seem that the witness would have to claim his privilege in order to avoid
prosecution. However, the Court rejected this conclusion by holding that
the witness need not raise his privilege to each question asked since it would
limit the statute to the protection already given by the Fifth Amendment.9
The co-existence of individual state sovereignties and a national sovereignty gives rise to the argument that the immunity accorded subpoenaed
witnesses by a state or federal statute exists only within the boundaries of
the particular jurisdiction in which the witness testifies.10 Therefore, other
jurisdictions could not be prevented from using the testimony and evidence
elicited to indict or prosecute the witness in a subsequent proceeding.
In spite of the logic of the argument the majority of decided cases have
held that statewide immunity is "complete immunity" since it is the only
protection the state can give to witnesses." Further justification for the
majority holding is that the "danger [of prosecution in other jurisdictions
based on the elicited testimony] is so inconsequential and remote [that]
...the only danger to be considered is one arising within the same jurisdiction.""
On the other hand the minority view has held that such "complete immunity" does not set-off the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,13 making it necessary, therefore, for the witness to raise the
privilege himself.
The Court, while recognizing the minority view, does not adopt it.
Rather it partially corrects the lack of "complete immunity" given by the
statute by interpreting the phrase "any court" as including state courts as
'1d. at 606.
'Adams v. Maryland, supra at 445.
See note 2, supra.
'See note 7, supra.
" See note 4, supra; 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2258 (3rd ed. 1940); Cf. Counselman
v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 12 Sup. Ct. 195 (1892) (This decision had held the
principle statute to give incomplete immunity to the supoenaed witness, therefore
not off-setting his Fifth Amendment privilege because it did not prevent the testimony elicited from being used to discover other evidence with which to indict or
prosecute.)
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. 370 (1905).

"2 Ibid.
' In re Watson, 293 Mich. 263, 291 N.W. 652 (1940).

